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Abstract. In her paper “Argumentation theory and the conception of epistemic
justification”, Lilian Bermejo-Luque presents a critique of deductivism in argu-
mentation theory, as well as her own concept of epistemic justification inspired
by the views of Stephen Toulmin. Reading this paper induced me to reflect
on the mutual relation between the notions of justification and argumentation.
In this work I would like to first draw the reader’s attention to a few issues
which seem debatable to me, or which I find worth presenting from a slightly
different point of view than that of Lilian Bermejo-Luque. I agree that deduc-
tivism is not suitable for a general theory of evaluation of arguments although
the critique of deductivism presented by the Author appears as not fully ade-
quate to me. Then I proceed to presenting my doubts about the “conception of
justification as a proper outcome of good argumentation” presented in the work.
I need to emphasise that due to a broad range of topics addressed by me in this
short paper, the description of some of them will be neither fully precise nor
exhaustive.
Keywords: argumentation, deductivism, justification, reasoning, argument eval-
uation
1. Deductivism – why is it wrong?
1.1. First, I would like to present several comments on deduction and de-
ductivism and on its relations with argumentation and justification. I agree
that deductivism is not suitable for evaluating arguments, although it seems
to me that L. Bermejo-Luque somewhat inadequately presents the prob-
lems that deductivism struggles with. According to the Author, applying
the rules of deductivism to arguments, the premises of which do not entail
their conclusions, unavoidably leads to the error of argumentative circular-
ity, which I cannot agree with. First, a few words on the logic of deduction
and its characteristics. The central notion in the logic of deduction is the
notion of entailment. Entailment is a relation between propositions which
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is constructed in such a way that true propositions may entail only true
propositions. The basis for the relation of entailment is the very meaning
of the words used (so-called logical constants). Speaking less strictly, this
means that if propositions A and B entail proposition C, then if anyone
thought that both A and B were true but C was false, they would be re-
vealing the fact of not having understood the meaning of one of the logical
constants used in propositions A and B or C. Such entailment is called a log-
ical one. The relation of logical entailment is broadly used in mathematics,
where it constitutes the foundation of theorem justification. In order to jus-
tify theorem T, i.e. to show that it is true, we would have to indicate true
theorems U, W, ... that T follows from. Of course, the first question that
arises is: how do we know that those theorems U, W... that we invoke in
justifying T are true? They obviously require justification, but once we jus-
tify propositions U, W... by use of other propositions X, Y... then another
question arises: how do we know that X, Y... are true? In other words, we
are facing the problem of regressus ad infinitum. In mathematics this does
not cause any difficulties. There is a certain category of “prime” theorems,
called axioms, which are accepted as true by force of an arbitrary decision.
Any proper justification of a theorem ends with them. If any of the theo-
rems U, W, ... is not an axiom, then it should be entailed from axioms or
theorems entailed from axioms, etc. It is enough to say that in mathematics
a true (justified) theorem is one which is entailed from axioms (in particular,
every theorem which is an axiom is entailed from axioms under the “from p
infer p” rule of logic). The question of motives for accepting a given theorem
as an axiom and the problem of the notion of truth in mathematics would re-
quire being discussed as a separate topic; however, it is not necessary for our
purposes. Mathematics for philosophers used to be an unattainable model
of a kingdom of absolute certainty and order. It is hard to be surprised by
this fascination. In mathematics a once-justified theorem remains justified
forever – it will never be revoked, it does not require being further specified
or complemented. Justification of a theorem is never partial, it is always
complete, and it consists in demonstrating the truthfulness of a theorem,
and not e.g. its high level of probability. Besides, due to applying formal
methods, the question whether a given theorem has been properly proven
or not can be solved in an unambiguous and objective way, independent of
any subjective feelings and inclinations of mathematicians.
1.2. The enumerated properties of the mathematical method strongly
tempt us to apply it outside mathematics, i.e. to base the process of jus-
tification on the relations of entailment in other fields as well – to deter-
mine that it defines the only proper justification. Such an approach, known
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as deductivism, in general terms determines that the only way of justify-
ing a theorem is to demonstrate that it is entailed from true theorems.1
L. Bermejo-Luque criticises deductivism in a way which, in my opinion,
is only partly correct. I shall start from saying that I agree with the Au-
thor’s statement that deductivism cannot handle the justification of general
theorems, such as: “Every raven is black”. The problem – as the Author
aptly indicates – is that even though it seems that this theorem is sup-
ported by the premise: “All the ravens observed so far were black”, it is not
entailed from it. In order to obtain the entailment that is recommended
by deductivism, an argument should be complemented with some premise.
If, however, we add such a premise, e.g. “If each observed raven is black
then every raven is black”, then an argument reconstructed in such a way
will, according to the Author, become a circular argument. If I understand
the Author’s thinking correctly, argument circularity in this case is based
on the fact that the addition of the mentioned premise was motivated only
by the desire to achieve entailment. And actually, if an essential premise for
an argument was guessed on the basis of such reasoning there is no doubt
we are dealing with circularity. However, things are different if our set of be-
liefs included – before considering the argument – some propositions which,
together with premises specified in the argument, allow for deductive infer-
ence. It is easy to imagine that somebody had already thought (correctly
or incorrectly) that if each observed raven was black, then every raven was
black (e.g. the person might think that birds of the same species always have
the same colouring).2 In such a case the premise for an argument would pro-
vide grounds to carry out deductive reasoning without ending up with the
error of circularity. Some error might occur here, but it would not be the
error of circulum in probando.
In my opinion the raven example and similar examples reveal the defect
of deductivism, namely the fact that we are very often ready to accept
general propositions, such as: “every raven is black”, even though we do not
know any set of true propositions that they are entailed from. This shows
that there are correct methods of justification which are beyond the reach
of the method indicated by deductivism.
1.3. Other examples of circularity provided by the Author raise even
more doubts. We cannot, for instance, consider the following argument: “it’s
raining, therefore you should take your umbrella” (p. 287), used in a regular
context, to be a circular argument. If there are such propositions in the set
of beliefs of the argument recipient as e.g. “if you intend to go for a walk
and it is raining, then you should take an umbrella” and “you intend to go
for a walk”, then after hearing the above mentioned argument the person
233
Krzysztof Szymanek
will carry out appropriate deductive reasoning leading to the argument’s
conclusion. I would like to note that I am not trying to solve the question of
the status of the indicated assertions used in the reasoning, which are not
the premises of the original argument. But are these the components of that
argument, e.g. its “hidden premises”? Answering this sort of question is part
of the theory of argumentation. However, in my opinion, no matter how this
theory solves the problem, one thing is certain: lack of entailment between
premises of an argument and its conclusion does not yet mean that deduc-
tivism cannot be successfully applied in its evaluation without the danger
of ending up with circulus in probando. The Author most apparently refers
to deductivism as a concept according to which a good argument is an ar-
gument whose premises entail a conclusion. Meanwhile, this does not – in
my opinion – constitute the essence of deductivism nor the condition sine
qua non for its use. In the opinion of Trudy Govier3 which I agree with,
there is no such thing as a deductive argument. There is, however, a deduc-
tive standard of argument evaluation – a standard, we should add, which
sometimes gives good results, but sometimes bad results.4 I would also like
to note that in mathematical works, i.e. in the kingdom of deductivism, we
very rarely come across arguments the conclusion of which is entailed from
the quoted premises. A mathematician e.g. reasons as follows: “x + 2 < 3,
so x < 1”. There is no logical entailment between the premise and inference
of this argument,5 but still we cannot accuse it of being circular.
2. How can arguments justify?
2.1. Before I proceed to discussing the concept of justification as pre-
sented by L. Bermejo-Luque I would like to present a few general remarks
to the notion of justification and its relations with the notion of argumen-
tation. If we are talking of justification of some proposition C in the course
of argumentation, we are thinking of indicating (explicite or implicite) other
propositions that were previously accepted, in the context of which proposi-
tion C deserves to be accepted. I am purposely using the phrase “C deserves
to be accepted” instead of “C is true”. If justification always consisted in
proving the truthfulness of a proposition, we would very rarely be able to
justify our views. Argumentation outside mathematics usually concerns em-
pirical assertions which can never be viewed as simply true. Even if we feel
psychological certainty about some proposition (e.g. “She is my relative”),
we can always be found to be mistaken. Every time we wish to justify an
empirical proposition we must carry out reasoning referring to other em-
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pirical propositions, e.g. scientific theories, which may, in some time, turn
out to be false.6 Another fundamental problem in empirical disciplines is
the lack of an equivalent for mathematical axioms, and as a result – the
inevitability of regressus ad infinitum. Thus, we cannot discursively prove
the truthfulness of any empirical proposition, though we may acknowledge
that it deserves our acceptance due to the fact that earlier, for some rea-
son, we had accepted another proposition. A fundamental problem can be
expressed as the following question: why should acceptance of propositions,
say A and B, make the acceptance of C something rational? Deductivism
does not provide a good solution in the field of empirical propositions. Even
if C logically follows from previously accepted propositions A and B, it does
not at all mean that C deserves to be accepted. The rules of logic state:
if A and B are true, then C also has to be true. We should not, however,
confuse this principle with a completely different rule, namely: “if A and B
are accepted, then C should also be accepted”, which is not a generally valid
principle. In order to find out how it functions, let us consider what would
happen if e.g. we had previously accepted “not-C”? Or if C contradicts A7?
Then, perhaps, we would rather withdraw our acceptance of A or B than
accept C. Henry Kyburg’s famous lottery paradox8 shows that propositions
of very high probability may entail a logically false proposition. Without
going deeper into deductivism9 we can note that its low utility is also due to
the fact that one of the rarest cases is when a proposition that we are about
to justify is entailed from previously accepted propositions. Most often we
justify propositions by means of propositions which do not informatively
include the proposition that is being justified, which means that we should
allow for a situation where the justifying propositions are true while the
justified one is not. There is, however, no clear, general theory that could
explain the essence of the justification relation between propositions. Par-
tial solutions are provided by inductive logic, but in practice its application
requires too many conditions and primary assumptions to be met. The only
branch of inductive logic that has practical application is statistical induc-
tion which concerns inferences related with population based on a sample.
In practice, evaluation of justification is, to a greater or lesser extent, intu-
itive. This means that we cannot clearly define nor specify particular steps
in a reasoning that binds justifying propositions with the justified one, nor
rules that would justify the correctness of those steps (this does not only
concern simple people, but also philosophers or scientists). Regardless of
which, reasoning in empirical disciplines is defeasible: it can always turn
out that some previously accepted proposition that we recollect contradicts
the correctness of the inference. If we follow this path of thinking we will
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finally arrive at a conclusion that all our knowledge about the world is al-
ways potentially, indirectly or directly engaged in the process of evaluating
the correctness of a justification.
2.2. The above remarks concern problems related with justification.
But what is the role of argumentation? In my opinion this is a phenomenon
of a different level, namely the level of communication. Argumentation is
something that a sender uses in order to provoke reasoning in the receiver
that would lead to justifying some claim. Arguments do not justify, but they
show – in a more or less precise way – the course of thinking that a receiver
ought to follow in order to find that a given claim deserves to be included in
their set of beliefs. In order to construct an argument for C, its sender has
to previously know the justification for C, or at least know what is going
to be accepted by the argument’s receiver as a correct justification for C.
The argument sender may not be able to provoke the desired reasoning in the
receiver. A special example of such a situation is when in our argumentation
we invoke propositions not accepted by the receiver. It may also happen
that acceptance of C might introduce a contradiction to the receiver’s set
of beliefs, e.g. not-C has been previously accepted. There are many other
reasons for an argument not to provoke the desired reasoning in a receiver.
Thus when we speak of a good argument we must always take into
account the receiver’s set of beliefs. There is no argument that can be con-
sidered good in absolute terms. An argument is either good or bad only in
relation to the receiver’s set of beliefs. Obviously, a good argument always
points to correct justification. But what does good justification consist in?
This question should be answered by the theory of justification, which differs
from the theory of argumentation, though it is, of course, strictly related
with the latter.
2.3. L. Bermejo-Luque rightly describes an argument as something
which is somehow related with the act of communication with its sender
and receiver. For the Author argumentation is “a communicative activity,
an attempt at showing a target claim to be semantically correct” (p. 300).
Such phrasing does not raise my objections, however, instead of “semanti-
cally correct” I would use a clearer expression, e.g. “acceptable” or “credi-
ble”. The Author presents a concept according to which justification is the
output of good argumentation, and in addition “it makes all the difference
which conception of argumentation we endorse” (p. 300).
Further she writes: “By arguing, we put forward a claim – i.e. we present
a certain content with a certain degree of assertive force – and by arguing
well, we justify that claim” (p. 300). Thus, in order to justify a claim we
need to provide a good argument for it. “[...J]ustifying is [...] a certain sort
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of successful communicative activity” (p. 300). Correctness of justification,
as I understand it, depends on the quality of the arguments used. A good
argument results in good justification – what remains is only to explain the
difference between a good argument and a bad one. On page 298 the Author
gives the following definition of validity: an argument is valid if its warrant is
semantically correct. This means that the presented concept of justification
points to the semantic correctness of warrants of the arguments used as
a criterion of the justification’s correctness. We need to say that this criterion
is rather vague. If we return for a moment to the deductivist concept of
justification, we will see that with all its flaws it has one great merit: it
explicitly indicates a procedure which allows effectively ascertaining whether
a justification is good or bad. This procedure consists in establishing whether
logical entailment is present between the premises and conclusion. But how
shall we verify if a warrant of a given argument is semantically correct?
According to what the Author says in her work, it seems that establishing
this is merely intuitive. In my opinion the concept of justification should
first of all indicate, as much as possible, a method for differentiating a good
justification from a bad one which would be free from intuitive evaluation,
objective, and would lead to unambiguous settlement of the problem. In my
opinion it is the touchstone of this concept’s value.
2.4. To illustrate what I am trying to say I will use an example of an
argument provided by the Author on page 299: “every observed raven is
black, therefore likely every raven is black”. The argument is presented by
the Author as an example of a valid argument, which is why if I prove
that it does not deserve to be treated as such, it will suggest that there
are some weak points in the discussed concept of justification. I think that
this argument should not be considered to be a good argument because
its value only depends on the receiver’s set of beliefs. I shall begin with
a different example of an argument, which might seem a bit artificial, but
which allows us to conduct a strict analysis. Let us imagine an urn which
contains 100 balls. Each ball may be either black or white. We draw 99 balls
from the urn at random. All of the balls turn out to be black. Can we
say, that it is likely that the last ball remaining in the urn is black? Well,
calculations based on the probability calculus show that the probability of
the last ball being black cannot be determined on the basis of the presented
data.10 In order to calculate this probability it is necessary to know the
a priori probability of the last ball in the urn being black (or the a priori
probability of various possible sets of balls in the urn). It is a highly non-
intuitive result: most people are prone to think that the probability of the
last ball being black is (a) high, (b) can be calculated on the basis of the
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fact that 99 balls drawn from the urn were black. I think that this proves
that the argument: “each of the 99 drawn balls is black, therefore likely the
last ball is also black” is not valid in any reasonable sense of this word.
Similar remarks may be referred to the raven example. We cannot justify
the thesis that likely all ravens are black by the mere fact that all ravens
encountered so far have been black. If, for instance, a scientist conducting
DNA tests on ravens concludes that one raven in a million is blue, he will
give to the assertion “all ravens are black” the a priori probability equal to
zero. Information of all the so far encountered ravens being black will not
affect his opinion on the properties of the set of all the ravens. If we arrive at
a conclusion that all ravens are black, we do not only take into account the
fact that all the so far observed ravens were black, but we allow for many
various, additional pieces of information: the number of observed ravens, the
circumstances of their observation, the intensity of our efforts to discover
any non-black raven, various biological data. The issue would require deeper
discussion – e.g. considering the raven problem from the point of view of
the so-called inference to the best explanation, but in this paper I have only
provided the most straightforward remarks.
3. Conclusion
In the end I would like to emphasise my intention of presenting my point
of view in the most clear and explicit way. I aimed at showing the essence
of differences between the Author’s position and that of mine, especially
with respect to the way of understanding justification and its relationship to
argumentation. Certainly these problems may be approached using a variety
of methods taken from very different areas of research. I found it useful to
plainly sketch out my own position. I did so mainly to make my point of view
open to further criticism. Critique and debate are indispensable ingredients
of all scientific endeavors.
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N O T E S
1 Cf an excellent discussion on deductivism in (Govier 1999). Deductivism as a stan-
dard of argument appraisal is defended in (Lambert et al., 1980). I consider it appropriate
to warn the reader that there are several meanings of the word “deductivism”. We con-
centrate here exclusively on deductivism in argument evaluation and are not interested
in e.g. Popper’s concept of falsification.
2 The premise under consideration is false (perhaps) but (a) it belongs to the set of
beliefs of a given person which is possibly a consistent set of beliefs, and (b) by virtue of
its logical form, it guarantees logical entailment to hold.
3 Cf (Govier, 1987, p. 43)
4 Because of lack of space I have had to leave out discussion about the relationship
between epistemic principles and the rules of deductive logic.
5 Please, note, that in the inference rule x + 2 < 3 / x < 1 there is not a single logical
constant, and thus we cannot speak of logical entailment.
6 Here it is worth mentioning the notes of Trudy Govier on the acceptability of argument
premises in (Govier, 2010, pp. 116–147).
7 Let us assume that we accept proposition A→ ∼A and we accept proposition A. Both
these sentences entail ∼A. Should we accept ∼A?
8 (Kyburg, 1961, p. 197)
9 For the brevity of presentation, I will not consider the details of the role of deduction
in mathematics, science, and everyday reasoning.
10 The calculations are considered elementary; they can be also found e.g. in (Hitchcock
1999).
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